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New Zealand, alongside Australia and Russia, formally acceded 
to the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) in October 2010. This fol-
lowed fifteen years of drift, a period during which initial strong 
interest, derailed by the opposition of Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad, subsequently became less certain as views 
of the forum’s utility to New Zealand dimmed. In effect, by the 
turn of the millennium, the issue of ASEM membership had been 
kicked into the long grass, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade was happy for it to remain until it became clear in mid-
2008 that Australia was pushing strongly for entry and was likely 
to succeed. This move had wrong-footed MFAT, forcing a rapid 
rethink of a policy that had rested, among other elements, on a 
view that New Zealand’s non-membership was acceptable given 
Australia’s parallel exclusion. The final volte face and scramble for 
membership was therefore motivated in large part by a fear of 
marginalisation, a concern that Australian entry would leave New 
Zealand in the untenable situation of being the only regional state 
outside the forum.1 Three years on, it is worth considering where 
New Zealand stands in relation to ASEM. Given its less than 
wholehearted accession, what benefits does it perceive in partici-
pation, and to what extent have these been achieved?
The Asia–Europe Meeting was launched in 1996 to strength-
en links between Europe and Asia, and to balance those of each 
of these regions with the United States. While motivated largely 
by economic concerns — a European interest in benefitting from 
the Asian economic miracle, and corresponding Asian concerns 
with access to the European single market — political and cul-
tural co-operation were also prioritised in the establishment of 
the forum. It was envisioned as a comprehensive partnership, 
one that was open, transparent and informal in nature, with no 
binding powers, but which would, nevertheless, pursue concrete 
results. Since its inception, ASEM’s breadth, both in terms of its 
membership (which has risen from 26 at the inaugural summit in 
1996 to 51 member states and organisations) and of its dialogue 
framework, has increased significantly. At the apex of the struc-
ture, providing direction to the process, are the biennial summit 
of heads of state and government and the foreign ministers’ meet-
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social, cultural and educational. 
Dialogue in each of these pillars occurs through a variety of reg-
ular and ad hoc ministerial meetings, officials’ meetings, working 
groups, experts’ groups and so on. In other words, ASEM is not 
a purely governmental forum, incorporating instead a range of 
Track 2 structures and processes alongside those of Track 1. It is 
this that gives ASEM its remarkable breadth of interaction, with 
on-going meetings and consultations occurring at a variety of 
levels on a daily basis. One of the most visible of these, and the 
only physical ASEM institution, is the third pillar’s Asia–Europe 
Foundation (ASEF), which focuses on intellectual, cultural, and 
people-to-people exchange, an element differentiating the Asia–
Europe Meeting from other international fora and one which has 
been accorded particular significance by the forum’s membership. 
In short, while the leaders’ summit and the FMM remain the 
most visible tip of the iceberg, it is in the structures below the 
waterline (such as the ASEF) where the bulk of productive en-
gagement is undertaken.
Wellington’s view
With limited resources for conducting external relations, New 
Zealand’s external policy has involved keeping a finger in as many 
pies as possible, while focusing efforts on those institutions and 
fora likely to deliver substantive results. Following early high ex-
pectations, particularly around the potential for trade liberalisa-
tion among its members, ASEM’s history in this respect has been 
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one of disappointment, with substantive engagement and con-
crete outcomes largely (though not completely) lacking. Instead, 
it has gained increasing value in the eyes of its participants as a po-
litical space, an ideational and discursive process, and an arena for 
dialogue without preconception. While this may be beneficial, for 
New Zealand it has been insufficient to elevate the Asia–Europe 
Meeting to the level of other regional fora in which it is engaged, 
notably APEC, the East Asian Summit, and the array of insti-
tutions associated with ASEAN. ASEM is, in other words, very 
much a ‘second order’ forum in the hierarchy of New Zealand’s 
external engagement. 
With substantive outcomes seemingly off the cards, MFAT 
aspirations for ASEM have rested on issues of access and posi-
tioning.2 Increased potential for dialogue and access as a function 
of the expansiveness of the process (in terms both of member-
ship and of scope) is perhaps the clearest point of attraction, be 
this utilising the forum as a mechanism for generating a greater 
understanding of regional perspectives on an array of topics, for 
addressing specific issues of priority to New Zealand, or for facili-
tating access to regional leaders and decision-takers. ASEM is seen 
to provide, in others words, a means to deepen engagement with 
key Asian and European leaders. Alongside this lies an interest in 
reinforcing New Zealand’s regional presence in Asia, contributing 
to the symbolism of being a part of the Asian caucus while not 
specifically an Asian state. In this respect, membership of ASEM 
is seen to contribute to the layering of fora in which New Zealand 
engages and integrates with its Asian partners, further demon-
strating that its interests and those of the Asian states are inter-
twined. This is an element that has been particularly prominent 
in New Zealand’s Asia strategy since the 2007 Asia white paper.3
Underwhelming performance
Underpinning each of these elements is the acknowledged impor-
tance of participation and engagement, as a means both of deliv-
ering dialogue and access, and of demonstrating credibility and 
commitment to a position in Asia. And yet with nearly three years 
having elapsed since accession, performance in this respect has 
been noticeably underwhelming, a situation shaped both by the 
resource constraint and the relative level of importance accorded 
ASEM. With limited resourcing allocated to ASEM engagement, 
the focus has been on the apex structures — the leaders’ summit 
and the FMM — though, as a second order forum, participation 
even in these structures has been at the low end of the spectrum, 
doing little to demonstrate any real commitment to the process in 
the eyes of the other participants.4 
The decision for John Key not to attend the eighth ASEM 
Summit in 2010, for example, the first to which New Zealand was 
invited, raised eyebrows among the forum membership. Indeed, 
such a dim view of this absence was taken, particularly among the 
Asian states, that the prospect of a new rule was raised, requiring 
acceding members to attend their first summit at the head of state 
or government level or potentially have membership placed on 
hold. Despite the view taken of such absences by its Asian part-
ners, New Zealand has continued on this line, with John Key 
again a no-show at the ninth Summit in 2012, and with Murray 
McCully’s non-attendance at the most recent Foreign Ministers’ 
Meeting in 2011.5 This stands in stark contrast to the approach of 
Australia, which has used such opportunities to strengthen exter-
nal relationships, engaging in bilateral discussions at the highest 
levels and pursuing its own economic and foreign policy agenda 
through active engage-
ment in various other 
ASEM fora.
Concomitant with 
the focus on apex struc-
tures has been the low 
level of New Zealand’s 
engagement in the 
various sub-summit 
and sub-ministerial 
ASEM fora. The bread 
and butter of ASEM 
co-operation lies in the 
formulation of initia-
tives at this lower level, 
and the organisation of Murray McCully
meetings and working groups on issues of priority to member 
states. Such elements contribute to the high density of on-going 
ASEM dialogue. New Zealand’s involvement in these structures 
has again, however, been extremely light,6 a matter noted by other 
ASEM partners as an area where improved performance would 
be particularly welcome, especially around proposing and driving 
initiatives.
Group positioning 
Where MFAT’s ASEM aspirations have most clearly been achieved 
is in relation to group positioning. Initially undermined through 
relegation to a ‘Temporary Third Grouping’ alongside Austral-
ia and Russia — a consequence essentially of disagreement as to 
whether the latter should join ASEM on the European or Asian 
side — New Zealand’s inclusion into Asia was achieved in March 
2012 when a solution to the Russia problem was found. Seen as 
symbolically significant by MFAT in reinforcing an asserted iden-
tity, this also had the practical impact of allowing New Zealand 
representatives to sit alongside their Asian counterparts in exercis-
ing group co-ordination functions. Importantly, however, even as 
part of the Temporary Third Grouping, New Zealand had adopt-
ed strategies to align itself more closely with the Asian grouping, 
approaching its inclusion as a virtual fait accompli. The decision 
to move responsibility for ASEM from the Asia to the Europe 
Division of MFAT, in effect calibrating the administration of the 
forum with the Asian states, is one such example. Alongside this 
stood the decision by New Zealand’s ASEF governor to caucus 
with the Asian states, in practice inviting himself to take part in 
their meetings so as to allow no assumption to emerge other than 
that New Zealand should be integrated into the Asian grouping.
     If, as has been recognised within MFAT and among New 
Zealand’s ASEM partners, participation and engagement is the 
key to drawing benefit from the Asia–Europe Meeting, then there 
remains some room for improvement. Setting aside the issue 
of the apex structures, New Zealand’s ‘under-representation’ at 
which is unlikely soon to be rectified, there remains significant 
space to increase participation as the basis for a future ASEM 
strategy. This must involve a recognition of the body of the ice-
berg below the waterline, and not least of pillar three (the ASEF 
pillar), a particular feature of ASEM under which a great weight 
of on-going interaction takes place. It must also involve an em-
phasis on the role of institutions beyond MFAT, be this in the 
form of Track 2 structures or, where appropriate, the participation 
of ministries and agencies beyond Foreign Affairs. Doing so may 
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facilitate the deepening of New Zealand’s engagement with the 
process without increasing the burden on MFAT itself. In this 
respect, a couple of potential paths are identifiable.
Structured framework
The Asia–Europe Foundation, as a forum for intellectual and cul-
tural exchange, provides a structured framework through which, 
for example, the people-to-people engagement highlighted in the 
2007 Asia white paper can be pursued. New Zealand is already 
an active participant in the ASEF at the board of governors level, 
and punches above its weight in terms of its funding, but has done 
little to build upon this.7 Successful extension of engagement 
within the framework of the foundation requires encouraging the 
participation in ASEF programmes of, in particular, secondary 
and tertiary education institutions and other relevant civil society 
organisations. The aim should be the establishment of workshops, 
programmes and processes reflecting a New Zealand influenced 
agenda.
Beyond Track 2 involvement, ASEM has been utilised by its 
members as a framework through which to address specific policy 
issues with relevant partner states, something increasingly seen as 
providing added value to the process. Again, this is an area where 
New Zealand could usefully do more, potentially identifying a 
small number of areas where engagement would prove beneficial 
— be this as a consequence of the precise constellation of partners 
in ASEM or of the lack of appropriate fora elsewhere — and en-
couraging the involvement of agencies beyond MFAT. One such 
example is in the field of education. In 2011, New Zealand played 
host to more than 97,000 foreign secondary and tertiary students, 
generating more than NZ$730 million for the education sector.8 
Of these, 70 per cent were drawn from Asian and 9 per cent from 
European ASEM members, with the forum, therefore, offering an 
opportunity to engage collectively with countries accounting for 
more than three-quarters of foreign student numbers. 
Education focus
Education matters have become increasingly prominent within 
ASEM in recent years, with an education ministers’ meeting be-
ing held four times since 2008,9 and the regular convening of 
meetings and working groups on such diverse issues as universi-
ty–business collaboration, quality assurance in higher education, 
the functioning of university credits systems, curriculum devel-
opment and so on. Given the importance of foreign fee paying 
students to the New Zealand education sector, issues such as 
quality assurance are clearly of significance, be this in terms of 
the qualifications earned in feeder states or of the recognition of 
those earned in New Zealand, particularly from private education 
providers such as language schools. Further, with the increased 
provision of offshore education services a key aspiration in the 
Ministry of Education’s international strategy,10 ASEM provides 
a potentially useful framework for dialogue with target states or 
indeed for sharing best practice with other ‘exporter states’.
Beyond engaging more with existing structures, the compre-
hensive nature of ASEM (with no a priori exclusions) provides 
space for the establishment of dialogues on matters of interest to 
New Zealand. Development, for example, remains a relatively un-
der-considered issue in the ASEM process, standing therefore as 
a significant opportunity for New Zealand to exercise leadership. 
With the Asia–Europe Meeting including six of the seven top do-
nors to the region, Pacific development may be one area where 
this can be exercised, with potential for discussion of regional pri-
orities and donor co-ordination, and indeed for addressing issues 
of concern (for example, those centred on the role of China).
Three years on, New Zealand’s engagement with the Asia–Eu-
rope Meeting remains tentative. If the most is to be gained from 
its membership, a flexible approach is needed, emphasising the 
participation of agencies beyond MFAT (including those at the 
Track 2 level). Such an approach offers the opportunity to move 
beyond the current light touch scenario, which is the consequence 
of limits imposed both by resourcing and by the second order rele-
vance of the process in MFAT’s hierarchy of external engagement, 
to strengthen New Zealand’s place in the process without corre-
spondingly increasing the demands placed on MFAT itself. From 
a base level of fostering people-to-people engagement through the 
ASEF to the more complex process of identifying priority issues 
and facilitating the participation of relevant agencies, there are 
a range of options open which together offer the possibility of 
achieving some of those benefits initially conceived, not the least 
of which is the demonstration of credibility and of commitment 
to the Asian space.
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